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2.1  Introduction 
One of the basic tenets of Keynesian economics is that labor market institu- 
tions tend to prevent nominal wage cuts-even  in the face of high unemploy- 
ment. An implication of this downward rigidity hypothesis is that inflation can 
ease labor market adjustments by speeding the decline in wages for individuals 
and markets buffeted by negative shocks.’ According to this argument a mod- 
est level of  inflation  may  serve to “grease the wheels” of the labor market 
and reduce frictional unemployment. In sharp contrast, an emerging orthodoxy 
among many economists and central bankers is that stable aggregate prices 
reduce labor market frictions and lead to the lowest possible levels of equilib- 
rium unemployment. 
In this paper we attempt to evaluate the evidence that relative wage adjust- 
ments occur more readily in higher-inflation environments. We focus on two 
types of evidence. First, at the individual level, we use panel microdata to ex- 
amine the  evolution  of  individual  real  wages  over  time.2 According  to the 
downward rigidity  hypothesis,  individual  wage changes should exhibit sig- 
nificant asymmetries, with a greater degree of asymmetry, the lower the infla- 
tion rate. Second, at the market level, average wages in a local labor market 
should fall faster in response to a given negative shock in a high-inflation envi- 
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1. This hypothesis is spelled out in Tobin 1972, for example. 
2. Previous studies of the extent of nominal rigidity in individual wage data include McLaughlin 
1994 and Kahn 1994. See also Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher 1995. 
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ronment than in low-inflation environments. This implies that the slope of the 
“cross-sectional Phillips-curve”-a  graph of the relationship between market- 
specific real wage growth and the market-level unemployment rate-will  be 
flatter in periods of low inflation, and steeper in periods of high inflation. 
Our microlevel  analysis is based on two complementary  sources of data: 
rolling two-year panels constructed from matched Current Population Survey 
(CPS) files from  1979 to 1993, and multiyear  panels from the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID). The CPS provides relatively  large and broadly 
representative samples, while the PSID provides better detail on job changing 
and enables  us  to examine the extent  of  nominal  rigidity  over longer time 
frames (one, two, and three years). Simple tabulations of both data sets lead to 
three  basic  conclusions.  First,  measured  year-to-year  changes in  individual 
wages are quite variable, even for people who remain in the same job. In a 
typical  year  during  the  198Os,  15520% of  non-job  changers  had  measured 
nominal wage declines, and a similar fraction had nominal wage increases in 
excess of  1076.’ Second, the most likely nominal wage change is zero: on aver- 
age during the 1980s, about  15% of non-job  changers report rigid  nominal 
wages from one year to the next. Third, the fraction  of  workers with rigid 
wages is strongly negatively related to the inflation rate, with each percentage- 
point reduction in inflation  leading to a 1.4 percentage-point  increase in the 
incidence of nominal rigidity. 
The presence of a large “spike” at zero in the distribution of measured nomi- 
nal wage changes-or  at minus  the inflation  rate in the distribution  of  real 
wage changes-leads  to the question of what the distribution would look like 
in the absence of nominal wage rigidity. We use the simple assumption of sym- 
metry to construct “counterfactual”  distributions of real wage changes in the 
absence of rigidities. We then use the counterfactual distributions to measure 
the fraction of negative real wage changes “prevented” by nominal wage rigidi- 
ties, and the net effect of nominal rigidities on average real wage growth. This 
exercise  suggests that downward  nominal  rigidities  in  a typical  year  in the 
1980s held  up the real  wage changes of workers by a maximum of  about  1 
percentage point per year. 
Our market-level analysis uses state-level average wages and unemployment 
from 1976 to 1991.  The wage data are constructed from the annual March CPS 
and are adjusted to reflect the varying composition of the workforce in each 
state in different years. Consistent with most of the recent literature on regional 
labor markets (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald 1994, we find that local unem- 
ployment exerts a strong influence on local wage determination:  real  wages 
fall in states with higher unemployment (relative to national trends), while real 
wages rise in states with lower unemployment. However, we find little evidence 
that  the rate of  wage adjustment across  local markets is faster in a higher- 
3. Of  course. some fraction of this measured variation  is attributable to survey measurement 
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inflation  environment.  Taken  in  combination  with  our microlevel  findings, 
these results imply that nominal rigidities have a small effect on the aggregate 
economy, and that any efficiency gains from the “greasing” effect of higher 
inflation are probably modest. 
2.2  Descriptive Analysis of the Distribution of Individual 
Wage Changes 
2.2.1  Data Sources 
Our analysis of individual-level wage changes is based on information from 
two data sources that collectively span the period from 1976 to 1993. Our first 
source consists of the “merged monthly earnings files” from the 1979 to 1993 
CPS. Each month,  the CPS collects hourly  or weekly  earnings  information 
from employed workers in the one-quarter of the sample frame who will not 
be interviewed in the next month.4 One-half of this group (or approximately 
one-eighth of all wage and salary workers in the overall sample) will be inter- 
viewed again in twelve months and asked the same earnings questions. The 
other half were interviewed  twelve months earlier and provided comparable 
earnings data at that time. By matching individuals from consecutive CPS sam- 
ples it is therefore possible to construct a series of “rolling panels” with two 
years of wage information. A typical panel contains about 60,000 individuals, 
of whom roughly 50,000 report data on either their hourly or weekly wage in 
both years5 
For most of our analysis of the CPS data we restrict attention to the roughly 
50% of  individuals  who report being paid by  the hour in both years of the 
Ideally, since most models of nominal wage rigidity pertain to workers 
who stay in the same job, we would like to distinguish between individuals 
who changed employers and those who did not. Unfortunately, the CPS does 
not regularly collect information  on job tenure or on the identity of specific 
employers. As a crude approximation, we distinguish between individuals who 
report the same (two-digit) industry and occupation in the two years, and those 
who report a change in industry or occupation.’  Finally, in order to minimize 
the confounding effects that institutionally  determined minimum-wage  rates 
4.  The data pertain to the individual’s main job as of the survey week, and are not collected for 
self-employed workers. 
5. Details of the matching algorithm and other information on the CPS samples are presented 
in appendix 2A. We do not use imputed wage data that are allocated in the CPS files to nonrespon- 
dents. 
6. This fraction is quite stable over the sample period. The advantage of using hourly-rated 
workers is that we can be sure their payment method is the same in both years. The CPS lumps all 
other payment periods (weekly, monthly, annual, and commission) into a single “other” category. 
7. Many of the observed industry or occupation switches are presumably attributable to misclas- 
sification errors (see Kmeger and Summers 1988). Changes in the industry and occupation coding 
system  introduced  between  1981  and  1983 necessitate  slightly  different  procedures  in  these 
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may have on the analysis of nominal rigidities, most of our analysis also ex- 
cludes observations that are directly affected or potentially affected by mini- 
mum wage regulations.* 
Our second source of data is the PSID. We constructed two four-year panels 
of wage observations from the PSID, for the period from 1976 to 1979, and 
from 1985 to  198tL9  Although the PSID has far fewer observations than the 
CPS panels and tends to overrepresent certain groups (such as older workers), 
it has several other advantages that enhance its usefulness  as a data source. 
First, individuals’  wages and labor market  experiences can be followed for 
several years in the PSID, while only consecutive-year matches are possible 
with the CPS. Second, the PSID questionnaire  collects information  on firm- 
specific  (or job-specific) tenure,  allowing  us to draw  a  cleaner  distinction 
between job movers and stayers.IO  Third, the PSID follows individuals  who 
change addresses,  while  the  CPS cross-sections  can  be  matched  only  for 
people who remain at the same address. Finally, the PSID provides us with 
data from the mid-l970s, a period of high inflation that can be compared to 
the mid- 1980s, when unemployment rates were similar but inflation rates were 
substantially lower. 
2.2.2 
We begin our analysis by presenting a series of histograms representing the 
distributions of year-to-year changes in real log hourly wage rates for the CPS 
and PSID samples described above. Figure 2.1 contains the histograms for the 
fourteen pairs of matched years from the CPS samples, based on wage changes 
for hourly-rated  workers reporting the same industry and occupation in each 
year. For scale reasons we have censored the log real wage changes at 50.35: 
the masses at the upper and lower extremes represent the cumulative fractions 
in the respective tails of the distribution. A vertical  line at minus the annual 
inflation rate (-T,) is drawn for each year to identify the real wage change 
associated with fixed nominal wages.” 
The histograms  show that real wage changes tend to be centered around 
The Distribution of Individual Wage Changes 
8. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) present evidence that minimum wages exert a major 
influence on  the lower tail of the wage distribution. We  consider a worker who is observed in 
periods t -  1 and t to be affected by the minimum wage if his or her wage is less than or equal to 
the contemporaneous minimum in either period. We consider a worker to be potentially affected 
if the wage in period t -  1 is below the minimum for year f. 
9. We decided to use two separate panels of four years each, rather than a single panel of individ- 
uals who were in the PSID sample from 1976 to  1988, in order to reduce the attrition caused by 
changing household composition, labor force entry and withdrawal, and the aging and refreshing 
of the PSID sample. 
10. Brown and Light (1992) note that the PSID tenure data contain errors that affect measured 
job changes. We adopt their recommended strategy of  assuming that a job change has occurred 
whenever reported tenure is less than elapsed time since the previous interview. 
1  I. Throughout the paper we measure inflation by  the change in the logarithm of the CPI-U- 
X 1. This series differs from the “official” CPI-U during 1979-82, since it uses a rental equivalence 
measure of housing cost comparable to the post-1982 CPI-U. 75  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
zero, with a prominent “spike” at -T,  (i.e., at the point corresponding to fixed 
nominal wages). The size of the spike tends to be greater during periods of 
lower inflation: in the late 1970s when inflation was around lo%, the fraction 
of rigid nominal wages was 7-8%;  in the mid to late 1980s, when inflation was 
at or below 5%, 15-20%  of workers had constant nominal wages. Interestingly, 
it appears that there is a deficit in the distribution of wage changes to the left 
of -T,,  suggesting that the distribution of real wage changes is being “swept 
up” to the floor imposed by rigid nominal wages. Nevertheless, a considerable 
fraction  of  non-job  changers  report  nominal  wage cuts  in  any  year-typi- 
cally 15-20%. 
Figure 2.2 presents the corresponding histograms of real wage changes for 
the PSID samples of hourly-rated workers in the same job in each year.I2 De- 
spite some differences in the way the wage data are collected in the PSID and 
CPS surveys, and the more precise  delineation  of  non-job  changers  in  the 
PSID, the wage change distributions from the two data sources are fairly simi- 
lar.13 In particular, the PSID data also show a prominent spike in the distribu- 
tion of real wages changes at -n,.  The spike is in the order of  10% during the 
high-inflation period 1976-79,  and about 20% during the low-inflation period 
1985-88. As in the CPS data, the wage change distributions in figure 2.2 show 
a deficit to the left of the spike, suggesting that the real wages of some workers 
who might otherwise experience nominal wage cuts are “held up” by  down- 
ward rigidities. 
Two  earlier  studies-by  Kahn  (1994) and  McLaughlin  (1994)-present 
comparable  analyses of the extent of nominal rigidity  in wage data derived 
from the  PSID.  Kahn  uses  data from  1970 to  1988 on  non-self-employed 
household heads  who have the  same employer in consecutive years.  Kahn’s 
graphs of the distributions of wage changes are very similar to those presented 
in figure 2.2, leading her to conclude that there is significant downward nomi- 
nal rigidity, and some evidence of “menu cost” effects (see below). McLaugh- 
lin uses data from  1976 to 1986 on household heads who report a wage or 
salary in consecutive years. Over this sample period he finds that about 7% of 
individuals have rigid nominal wages (see his figure 4). Nevertheless, McLaugh- 
lin concludes that there is little evidence of nominally induced asymmetries in 
the distribution of real  wage changes. We believe that this conclusion arises 
from McLaughlin’s decision to pool real wage changes from different years. 
As shown in  figures 2.1 and 2.2, the spike in the distribution  of  real  wage 
changes  occurs  at -n,,  which  ranges  from  -2  to -11%  in  McLaughlin’s 
12. The measures of job tenure used in the two panels of the PSID differ: for the 1976-79  panel 
job tenure refers to the position, while for the 1985-88  panel it refers to the employer: 
13. Appendix figure 2A. 1 shows the distributions of wage changes for all workers in the PSID 
who report wages in each year-that  is, including non-hourly-rated workers and those who change 
jobs. The patterns are similar to those in figure 2.2, except that the size of the spike is smaller- 
approximately one-half of the size observed for hourly-rated non-job  changers-and  there is more 
mass in the tails of the distribution. 1474  80 
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Fig. 2.1 
samples from 1979-80 to 1992-93 
Histograms of the distribution of log real wage changes, matched CPS 
sample. Pooling the data for different years thus obscures the spike in the real 
wage change distribution in any particular year.’j 
While most  discussions of  nominal  wage  rigidity  implicitly  focus on a 
yearly time frame, the degree of wage rigidity (either downward or upward) is 
clearly a function of the time horizon over which wage changes are measured. 
For example, we would expect to see a very high degree of nominal rigidity in 
week-to-week wage changes (at least in the U.S. labor market), but very little 
14. Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1995) use  PSID data for  1970-88  to measure rigidities 
among hourly- and non-hourly-rated workers. Their estimate of  the fraction of workers with rigid 
nominal wages and nominal wage cuts is similar to ours. 78  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
Fig. 2.2 
197679 and 1985-88,  hourly-rated workers, same employer 
Histograms of the distribution of log real wage changes, PSID samples 
rigidity  in decade-to-decade  wage changes. To  get a sense of  the effects  of 
different time frames, figure 2.3 presents histograms of real wage changes over 
two- and three-year time horizons for hourly-rated workers in the PSID who 
remain with the same employer. These histograms have the same basic charac- 
ter as the year-to-year histograms in figure 2.2, although the magnitude of the 
spike  corresponding  to  rigid  nominal  wages  is  smaller.  During  the  low- 
inflation period  1985-88,  about  10% of hourly rated  non-job  changers had 
constant wages over two years, compared with only 3% in the high-inflation 
period  1976-79.  Over a three-year horizon, the fraction of observations with 
rigid  wages is about 5%  in the  low-inflation  era, and  about  1%  in the late 
1970s. Some degree of nominal wage rigidity clearly persists more than a year. 79  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
B:  3-years 
1’176~74 
Fig. 2.3 
(A)  and three-year (B)  horizons, PSID samples, hourly-rated workers, same 
employer 
Histograms of the distribution of log real wage changes, over two-year 
Furthermore, long-term rigidity is more pervasive during low-inflation periods 
than during high-inflation periods.  l5 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarize some of the information contained in the his- 
tograms in figures 2.1-2.3.  Table 2.1, which pertains to our CPS samples of 
hourly-rated  workers,  presents  the  annual  inflation  rate,  the  unemployment 
rate,lh the median nominal wage change for all hourly-rated workers, the frac- 
15. Appendix figure 2A.2 contains the histograms for two- and three-year wage changes for all 
workers from the PSID samples. These figures again show similar. although smaller, rigidity ef- 
fects to those for hourly-rated  non-job  changers,  closely matching the patterns for single-year 
wage changes. 
16. Measured as the average unemployment rate during the ending year of each change. 80  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
Table 2.1  Characteristics of Wage Change Distributions in CPS Samples 
8  of all Hourly 
Aggregate Data  Median  Workers withb 
Nominal  9%  Rigid 
Inflation  Unemployment  Wage  Nominal  Rigid  (exclude 

























































11.6  7.3 
12.1  7.2 
16.4  13.0 
17.7  17.1 
17.8  16.7 
18.4  16.4 
19.1  17.1 
19.1  17.3 
18.0  16.4 
17.2  15.5 
17.3  14.3 
18.2  14.9 
18.9  17.4 















Notes: Based on matched CPS samples. See text and appendix A for description of samples. 
'Inflation  rate is one hundred times the change in  the log of the CPI-U-XI. 
hIndividuals who report being paid by the hour in both years, and who report the same two-digit 
industry and occupation in both years, except for 1982-83,  1983-84, and 1988-89.  See table 2.4.1, 
note a. 
'Sample  excludes individuals whose first-year wage does not exceed the minimum wage in either 
year, or whose second-year wage does not exceed the minimum wage in the second year. 
tion of workers with measured nominal wage declines, and two estimates of 
the fraction of workers with zero nominal wage changes-one  for all hourly- 
rated  workers,  and  a  second  for the  subsample  of  workers  unaffected  by 
minimum-wage regulations. Table 2.2 pertains to the PSID data, and shows the 
inflation rate and the fraction of workers with rigid nominal wages over one-, 
two-, and three-year  time frames in the  1976-79  and  1985-88  periods. For 
comparison purposes we report both the overall fraction of workers with rigid 
nominal  wages (columns 2  and  S), and the fraction of hourly rated non-job 
changers with rigid wages (columns 3 and 6). 
Taken as a whole, we believe that the data in figures 2.1-2.3  and tables 2.1 
and 2.2 present a reasonable prima facie case for the existence of  downward 
wage rigidity  for a significant fraction of  workers. Although  many  non-job 
changers  report  nominal  wage  declines,  the  most  likely  outcome  is for no 
change in nominal wages: between 6 and 17% report exactly the same nominal 
wage in one year as the next.I7 Furthermore, the extent of the rigidity is higher, 
17. Note that any measurement error in wages is likely to lead to an overstatement of the proba- 
bility of  nominal wage declines and an understatement in the probability of  rigid nominal wages. 
We consider the effects of measurement errors in more detail below. 81  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
Table 2.2  Characteristics  of Wage Change Distributions in PSID Samples 
% Rigid  % Rigid 
Inflation  Inflation 
Rate”  All  Hourlyb  Rate  All  Hourlyh 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  Year  (4)  (5)  (6) 
One-Year Wage Changes 
~~ 
1976-77  6.3  7.4  9.3  1985-86  1.8  88  15.6 
1977-78  7.3  6.2  7.8  1986-87  3.6  10.1  16.5 
1978-79  10.3  6.8  7.8  1987-88  41  10.6  16.0 
Tho-Year Wage Changes 
1976-78  13.6  2.4  3.1  1985-87  5.4  4.7  7.9 
1977-79  18.1  1.9  2.1  1986-88  7.6  5.3  8.4 
Three-Year Wage Changes 
1976-79  24.4  0.9  1.2  1985-88  9.5  2.8  4.7 
Notes: The unemployment rates during the respective periods are 1977,7.1%; 1978, 6.1%; 1979, 
5.8%; 1986,7.0%; 1987, 6.2%; 1988, 5.5%. 
‘Inflation rate is one hundred times the change in the log of the CPI-U-XI over the relevant time 
period. 
bIndividuals who report being paid by  the hour in the beginning and ending years, and report no 
change in “position” (1976-79)  or “employer” (1985-88). 
the lower the rate of inflation. A regression of the fraction of workers with rigid 
wages in table 2.1 on the inflation rate yields a coefficient of -  1.39 (t = 12.1) 
with an R2  coefficient of 0.92. This implies that each percentage-point decrease 
in the inflation rate increases the incidence of rigid wages among hourly-rated 
nonmovers by  1.4 percentage points. Finally, inspection of the histograms in 
figures 2.1-2.3  suggests that some of  the mass at the rigid-wage spike repre- 
sents workers who would have experienced even bigger real wage cuts in the 
absence  of a nominal wage  floor. In  section 2.4 we present a more formal 
analysis of this issue. Before turning to this analysis, however, we consider 
two auxiliary questions: whether the extent of wage rigidity is systematically 
different for hourly-rated versus other workers; and whether the extent of mea- 
sured nominal rigidity is affected by the tendency for workers to “round” their 
reported wages. 
2.3  Is the Extent of Nominal Rigidity Overstated? 
2.3.1  Hourly-Rated versus Other Workers 
All of the CPS data analyzed in the last section, and most of the PSID data, 
pertain to workers who report that they were paid by the hour. In the matched 
CPS samples, however, only about one-half of workers report that they are paid 82  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
by  the hour in both  the  beginning  and end years.I8 This raises the question 
of  whether measures of  nominal rigidity based on hourly-rated  workers  are 
representative of the overall labor force. 
To  get  some evidence  on  this  issue,  we  examined  changes  in  reported 
weekly earnings for individuals in the CPS samples who reported being non- 
hourly-rated in both years of our two-year ~ane1s.l~  The results of this analysis 
suggest that the incidence of rigid nominal wages is slightly higher for non- 
hourly-rated workers. For example, between  1979 and 1980, 7.4% of “always 
hourly-rated” workers with no change in industry or occupation had rigid nom- 
inal wages,  versus  10.9% of  “always non-hourly-rated”  workers. Similarly, 
between  1987 and  1988 16.4% of  “always hourly-rated”  workers had  rigid 
wages, versus  18.4% of  “always non-hourly-rated” workers. There are some 
other differences between the distributions of  real wage changes for hourly- 
rated and non-hourly-rated  workers. Most noticeably, the dispersion in real 
wage changes for non-hourly-rated workers tends to be larger: the interquartile 
range of the change in real weekly pay for non-hourly-rated workers with the 
same industry and occupation is about 25-50%  higher than the interquartile 
range of the change in real hourly pay for hourly-rated workers with the same 
industry and occupation. We  suspect that the measurement errors in weekly 
pay for non-hourly-rated workers are larger than the errors in hourly pay for 
hourly-rated workers, in part because workers are asked to report their “usual” 
weekly pay rather than a “straight-time” earnings measure. In any case, there 
is no evidence that nominal wage rigidity is lower for non-hourly-rated work- 
ers, and for simplicity we therefore confine our attention to hourly-rated work- 
ers in the remainder of this paper. 
2.3.2  Rounding of Wages and the Incidence of Measured Rigidities 
One of  the most prominent features of  observed wage distributions is the 
tendency for workers to report “rounded” wage amounts, like $5.00 per hour, 
or $7.50 per hour. Among hourly-rated workers in our matched 1984-85  CPS 
file, for example, 34% reported an even dollar wage amount in  1984, and an- 
other 14% reported a wage rate ending in 0.50. If some or all of this phenome- 
non is due to systematic rounding (or “heaping”) of data drawn from an under- 
lying  continuous  distribution,  then  one explanation  for measured  nominal 
wage rigidity is that individuals with small nominal wage changes tend to re- 
port the same rounded wage amount in consecutive surveys. A simple tabula- 
tion  of  the probability  of zero nominal  wage  growth by  the  initial level of 
wages reveals some support for this hypothesis. In the 1984-85 CPS file 24.1  % 
of individuals who reported an even wage amount in 1984 had rigid nominal 
18. The fraction is similar for workers who report the same industry and occupation in both 
years and are therefore classified as non-job  changers. 
19. In principle we can construct an hourly wage for non-hourly-rated workers by dividing usual 
weekly earnings by  usual weekly hours. However, any measurement error in reported hours will 
lead to excessive volatility in imputed hourly wages. 83  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
wages between 1984  and 1985,  versus a rigidity rate of only 9.2% for individu- 
als who reported a wage amount not ending in either .OO or SO.  In our matched 
CPS samples, individuals who reported an even dollar wage amount in the base 
year typically account for 55-60%  of all those with rigid nominal wages. 
The interpretation of these facts, however, depends crucially on the underly- 
ing explanation for spikes in the distribution of wages at dollar and fifty-cent 
intervals. If the true wage distribution contains spikes, and employees are more 
likely to report their true wage if it is an easily remembered amount like $5.00 
or $7.50 per hour, then the measured rigidity rate for individuals who report 
an even wage may be a better estimate of the true rate of nominal rigidity than 
the overall rigidity rate for all wage earners. Some support for this hypothesis 
comes from the fact that the residual variance of a conventional wage equation 
is slightly lower when the model is fit to the subsample of workers who report 
a rounded wage amount than when the same model is fit to workers who report 
a wage that does not end in .OO or 50.*O  This evidence suggests that the noise 
in measured wages is lower for workers who report a rounded wage, contrary 
to the view that rounding is purely a result of measurement error. 
To further explore this issue we used data from a January  1977 CPS valida- 
tion  study that  collected self-reported  wage  information  from workers  and 
matching information from their employers (see Card 1996 for more informa- 
tion  on this  survey). Among hourly-rated  workers paid above the minimum 
wage, the probability of a rounded wage (ending in either .OO or SO)  is 30%- 
somewhat below the rate of 38% in our matched 1979-80  CPS sample.2’ The 
probability that the employer reports a rounded wage is lower (20%) but is far 
from negligible. Overall, 44% of employers and employees report exactly the 
same wage, with a significantly higher agreement rate (69%) conditional  on 
the employer’s reporting  a rounded wage. Treating the employer reports  as 
truth, these data imply that about one-half of the observed mass at rounded 
wage values is attributable to spikes in the true distribution of wages, with the 
other half attributable to rounding errors.22 
To  get an indication of  the potential contribution  of rounding behavior to 
measured  rigidity  rates, we decided to perform a simple simulation.  In the 
20. Specifically, we fit a model to the log hourly wage for hourly-rated workers in our pooled 
CPS files who report a wage ending in .OO or SO  and for those with other wages. The explanatory 
variables included education, a gender-specific cubic in experience, nonwhite and female dum- 
mies, and indicators for region and year. The residual standard error is slightly lower in the model 
for rounded wage observations than in the model for nonrounded observations. A similar finding 
holds by year. 
21. The fraction of wages reported at even dollar or half-dollar amounts rose over the 1980s 
from 38% in 1979 to 48% in 1984 to 56% in  1992. We suspect that this trend may be due in part 
to inflation: at higher nominal wage levels, the percentage difference between “rounded’ wage 
amounts is smaller, implying less “cost” to paying a “rounded’ wage amount, andor a smaller 
error in reporting a “rounded’ amount. 
22. Specifically, if 20% of employers report a rounded wage, and 69% of workers whose em- 
ployer reports a rounded wage report the same wage, then  14% (= 0.20 X 0.69) of workers report 
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simulation we assume that individual wage changes are generated from a con- 
tinuous distribution, and that individuals have some probability  of  reporting 
either their true wage, a rounded wage, or their true wage plus a measurement 
For plausible  values  of  the  parameters,  the  simulation  implies  that 
rounding generates a 4-5%  rate of apparent nominal wage rigidity  when the 
inflation rate is 5% and there is zero median wage growth. We believe this is 
an upper bound on the fraction of observed nominal rigidity that can be attrib- 
uted to rounding behavior. If  some of the observed rounding is due to spikes 
in the true distribution of wages at even wage amounts, or if the probability of 
reporting a rounded wage is less persistent over time than we have assumed, 
then the share of observed wage rigidity attributable to rounding is smaller. 
An important feature of  rounding behavior is its symmetry. Provided that 
individuals round  their wages to the nearest  even  amount, rounding causes 
nominal wage changes above and below zero to be drawn toward zero. In this 
regard, rounding by employees is similar to “menu costs” that cause employers 
not to adjust wages if the optimal wage adjustment is small. By comparison, 
downward  nominal  rigidities  exert  an  asymmetric  effect  on  workers  who 
would otherwise experience a nominal wage cut. In the next section we show 
how the symmetric effect of  rounding or related phenomena can be used to 
empirically  distinguish  the  contribution  of  downward rigidities  to the total 
measured rigidity rate. 
2.4  Measuring the Effect of Inflation on Wage Rigidities 
2.4.1  Conceptual Framework 
Suppose that  in  the  absence  of  rigidities  the  distribution  of  real  wage 
changes would be continuously distributed with some mean m. In the presence 
of rigidities, suppose that some individuals whose nominal wages would other- 
wise fall experience zero wage growth. This scenario is illustrated in figure 
2.4A under the assumptions that m = 0, that the inflation rate 7~ is 5%,  and that 
one-half of individuals who would otherwise experience a negative real wage 
change are affected by downward rigidities. As illustrated by the figure, the net 
effect of downward nominal rigidity is to produce a deficit in the left-hand tail 
of the distribution of real wage changes (below -7~)  and a spike in the distribu- 
23. In the simulation we assume that individual log wages are normally distributed according 
to a stationary autoregressive model, and that measured wages are generated as follows: with some 
probability @,) a worker reports the true wage: with some probability @J the worker rounds the 
wage to the nearest even 50-cent amount; and with some probability (I -  pI -  pz)  the worker 
reports the true wage plus a (normally distributed) random measurement error. We  calibrated the 
model by fixing the cross-sectional standard deviation of true log wages and the correlation of true 
log wages across years at 0.45 and 0.95, respectively. We  set pI = pz = 0.45 and assumed that 
three-quarters of individuals who round their wage report in one year also round their report in the 
next year. 85  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
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Fig. 2.4  Theoretical effects on the distribution of real wage changes. A, 
downward nominal rigidities and, B, downward nominal rigidities and 
menu costs 
tion at -T.~~  It is easy to see that as the inflation rate falls (i.e., as -T  moves 
to the right) the effect of nominal rigidity becomes more pronounced. 
A second source of nominal wage rigidity that we will attempt to separately 
identify is that due to menu  costs or rounding in reported  wage levels. For 
example, suppose that if the “optimal” nominal wage change is between ?x%, 
then there is some probability that the nominal wage will not change. Figure 
2.4B illustrates this scenario when menu costs are present for wage changes of 
up to +2%, and the probability of nonadjustment declines symmetrically from 
25% for a zero wage change to 0 for a 2%  nominal wage change. To the extent 
that the density is not constant around  -IT, this assumption implies that menu 
costs  induce  asymmetric  deficits in  the  observed  distribution  of  real  wage 
changes on either side of -IT: if  -IT  lies in the left-hand tail of the distribution, 
there will be a larger menu-cost deficit to the right of  -IT  than to the left. If 
both downward rigidities and menu costs are present, we would expect to see 
a deficit in the distribution of real wage changes immediately to the left of -T, 
a somewhat larger deficit to the right of  -IT, and a spike at -T  that is larger 
24. Note that if the effect of the rigidities is translated entirely into quantity effects (it., unem- 
ployment) there will be no spike. However, the deficit in the left-hand tail of the distribution of 
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than the “deficit” to the left of  -T  (by the amount of the deficit to the right of 
-T).  In principle, if the fraction of  underlying wage changes that have been 
shifted down to zero can be estimated, then this fraction, suitably adjusted to 
take account of the different density on either side of  the spike, can be sub- 
tracted from an estimate of the fraction of underlying wage changes that have 
been shifted  up to zero to obtain an estimate of  the net effect of  downward 
rigidities. 
2.4.2  Identifying a Counterfactual Wage-Change Distribution 
The key issue in estimating the effect of nominal wage rigidities is the iden- 
tification  of  a “counterfactual”  distribution-a  model for the distribution of 
real wage changes in the absence of downward wage rigidities and menu costs. 
The counterfactual that we adopt in this paper is based on the following three 
assumptions: (I)  in the absence of rigidities, the distribution of wage changes 
would be symmetric; (2)  the upper half of  the distribution of  observed wage 
changes is unaffected by  rigidities; and (3) wage rigidities do not affect em- 
ployment probabilities. Under these assumptions, the upper half of the distri- 
bution of  observed wage changes can be  used  to infer what the lower half 
would have looked like in the absence of rigidities. 
Although there is no a priori reason for imposing assumption 1, we believe 
that symmetry is a natural starting point for building a counterfactual distribu- 
tion. Moreover, most conventional models of wage determination imply sym- 
metry. For example, if real wage outcomes in consecutive periods are jointly 
normally distributed, or if the individual wage determination process is station- 
ary, then symmetry holds.25  An alternative approach, pursued by Kahn (1994), 
is to use the observed distribution of  wage changes in other periods to infer 
the counterfactual in the absence of rigidities. An important objection to this 
alternative is that the dispersion of wage changes may be affected by inflation. 
Thus in this paper we rely on the symmetry assumption. 
The second assumption, that wage changes above the median are unaffected 
by downward rigidities, may seem relatively innocuous. However, the presence 
of measurement errors in wages may lead downward nominal rigidities to exert 
some influence on the upper half of  the observed wage-change distribution. 
Specifically, let Aw?  represent the true wage change of a given worker from 
period t -  1 to t, and let 
Aw, = Aw? + Au, 
represent the measured wage change, where Au, is the measurement error in 
wage growth. Suppose that Au, is symmetric with median  zero. Then if  the 
distribution of true wage changes AwF  is asymmetric (as implied by the down- 
25. At least for workers in middle age, the assumption of  stationarity may be appealing. If the 
has  process generating w,,.  the real wage of individual i in period t, is stationary, then w,,  ~ 
the same distribution as w+,  - w,,,  implying that wage changes are symmetric. 87  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
ward rigidity hypothesis) the median of observed wage changes will not neces- 
sarily equal the median of  Aw;.  Indeed, if  Aw;  has the  shape illustrated in 
figure 2.4a, then the median of observed wage changes will tend to exceed the 
median of Aw,?.*~  We return to this issue in more detail below. 
The third assumption is perhaps the most problematic. Indeed, since much 
of the interest in downward nominal wage rigidity is driven by a concern over 
potential employment effects, the assumption that any employment effects may 
be ignored is troubling.  One way  to relax  assumption 3 is to assume (3’) a 
fraction  2(~  of jobs that would  otherwise  be observed-all  associated  with 
nominal wage changes below the median-are  lost due to nominal wage rigid- 
ities. In this case, a counterfactual distribution can be constructed by taking 
the observed distribution of  wage changes beyond the 0.5 -  a  quantile, and 
building a symmetric lower tail. For example, if 2% of continuing jobs are lost 
because of downward wage rigidities, then an appropriate counterfactual is the 
symmetric distribution constructed from the observed distribution to the right 
of the 49th percentile. In the analysis below, we also construct such a “49th 
percentile counterfactual” distribution and derive summary statistics from this, 
as a robustness check on the results from the “median” counterfactual.27 
Formally, let fix) denote the probability density function of  observed real 
wage  changes in some period (for some given sample of  workers). Let f(x) 
denote  the  counterfactual  density  function.  Then  assumptions  1-3  or  1-3‘ 
imply 
f(x) = kc.f(x), 
?(x)  = kC*f(2c  -  x), 
x 2 c; 
x <  C, 
where k,  is a constant and c is the point of symmetry. Under assumption 3, c is 
equal to the median observed wage change, while under assumption 3‘, c is 
equal to the 0.5 -  (Y quantile. Using the fact thatAx) must integrate to 1, it is 
easy to see that k,  = 0.54  1 -  F(c)),  where F is the distribution function associ- 
ated with$  Note that if c = m (the observed median) then F(c) = 0.5 and kc = 
1. Otherwise, if c is the 0.5 -  a  quantile, then k,  = 1/(  1 + 2a) = 1 -  2a. 
2.4.3 
Given an observed distribution of real wage changes and a particular count- 
erfactual distribution, it is possible to develop a variety of measures of  the 
effect of nominal rigidities. We focus on two simple summary statistics: a mea- 
Measuring the Effects of Rigidities 
26. Intuitively, measurement errors smear some of the true mass at -T, to the left and right of 
the spike. Any measurement errors larger than T,  will therefore displace a nonzero mass to the 
right of the median of Aw,?. 
27. An alternative is to construct the counterfactual distribution by  imposing symmetry around 
the mode of the distribution of observed wage changes. This is equivalent to assuming that, in the 
absence of rigidities, the wage-change distribution would be symmetric with median equal to the 
mode. We tried this approach, but found that the resulting counterfactual distribution is extremely 
sensitive to the location of the mode. Also, in several years the mode is above the median, which 
would imply job gains, rather than job losses, from nominal rigidities. 88  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
sure of  the fraction of people whose wages are affected by  rigidities,  and a 
measure of the net effect of rigidities on the average wage change. 
Density Effects 
In principle, nominal wage rigidities can affect workers whose wages would 
have fallen  in the absence of rigidity,  and people whose  wages would  have 
otherwise risen. Thus, we decompose the fraction of workers affected by rigid- 
ities into an estimate of the fraction whose wages were “held up,” and an esti- 
mate of the fraction whose wages were “held down.” The former is the cumula- 
tive density of the counterfactual distribution that has been “swept up” to the 
nominal wage rigidity spike (at -T,): 
where the upper limit of integration (-T,-)  excludes the mass point at -r,, 
and P(x) and F(x)  are the cumulative distribution functions corresponding to 
f(x) andf(x) respectively. The latter is the cumulative density of the counterfac- 
tual distribution that has been “swept back” to the nominal-wage rigidity spike: 
-  (F(m,) -  F(-C)), 
where m, is the median  real  wage change in year  t, and the  lower limit of 
integration (-n:)  excludes the mass point at -rr.  (Note that by assumption 2 
above, we need only extend the upper limit of integration to the median.) The 
total fraction of individuals affected by rigidities is su, + sb,, which is equal to 
the mass at the spike point (suitably normalized, if the point of symmetry for 
the construction of the counterfactual density is not equal to the median). 
If  estimates of F(x)  and F(x) are available, then su, and sb, can be evaluated 
directly.’# In the absence of any menu costs or “rounding,” su, provides an esti- 
28. Alternatively, using the definition of the counterfactual density, it is easy to show that 
(1’)  SU,  = kc . (1 -  F(2c + IT,)) -  F(-T;  ), 
where F is the distribution function of observed wage changes in year I,  c is the point of symmetry 
for the councerfaccual, and  k,  is the constant defined  earlier. This expression can be evaluated 
directly using the empirical distribution function for observed real wage changes. If c is set to the 
median real wage change in year t(m,),  this expression simplifies to su, = (1 -  F(2m, + IT,)) - 
F( -IT<-), and if  m, = 0 (which  is roughly true for most of our sample years) then su, = (I -  F(IT,)) 
-  F(-IT,-j, which represents a simple difference between the fraction of real wage changes ubove 
IT, and the fraction below -IT,.  Similarly, the fraction of the density swept back can be written as 
(2‘)  sb, = kc . (F(2c  + 71,) -  F(2c -  m,)) -  (Ffm,) -  F(-IT;)), 
which, if  the point of aymmetry is set to the median, reduces to sb, = F(2m, + IT,) -  .5 -  (.5 - 
F( -IT,+  j), or to sb, = F(aJ -  .5 -  (.5 -  F( -IT;)),  if m, = 0. This last expression is simply the 
fraction of  observed wage changea  between IT, and the median minus the fraction between the 
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mate of the fraction of workers affected by downward wage rigidities. In the 
presence  of  menu costs or rounding, however, su, will tend  to overstate the 
effect of downward rigidities. Nevertheless, if menu costs affect an equal frac- 
tion of workers who otherwise would receive small nominal increases and de- 
creases (as assumed in figure 2.4b), then the net sweep-up su, -  sb, provides a 
lower-bound estimate of the fraction of workers affected by downward nomi- 
nal wage rigidity. To see why, notice that the counterfactual density to the right 
of  -rr, is bigger than the counterfactual density to the left. Thus if equalfruc- 
[ions of the counterfactual are affected by menu costs, the total density swept 
back to  -rr,  by  menu  costs (measured by sb,) will  exceed the total density 
swept up to -T,  by menu costs. 
Wage Effects 
In constructing a measure of the effect of nominal rigidities on average wage 
growth,  we  similarly  distinguish  between  the  effect  for individuals  whose 
wages are “held up” by rigidities  and the effect for those whose wages are 
“held back.” The effect on the former group is 
~  n, 
wsu, = [  (f(x) -  f(x))(-rr,  -  x)  dx 
J -_ 
(3)  = -T,SU,  -  E(AwlAw < -~,;f)  X  P(-n;) 
+ E(AwlAw < -~,;f)x  F(-T;), 
which we refer to “wage sweep-up,’’ while the effect on the latter group is 
my 
(A4 -  f(x))(-r, -  x)  dx  L7 
wsb, = - 
(4)  = Tpb, + E(AwI-IT, < AW 5 m,;f)  X  (P(m,) -  F(-T:)) 
-  E(AwI-T, < AW 5 m,;f)  X  (F(m,) -  F(-T;)), 
which we refer to as “wage sweep-back.’’ Again, if estimates of the densities 
flw) and  fix)  are available, these expressions can be evaluated directly. Alterna- 
tively, they can be estimated using estimates of the fractions of individuals in 
various  wage-change intervals,  and the mean wage change within  these in- 
terval~.~~ 
29. Specifically, using the definition of  the counterfactual density, it is straightforward to show 
that 
(3’)  wsu, = kc.  (1 -  F(2c + a,)  . (E(AwlAw  2  2c + a,)  -  a,) 
- F(-a;).  (-a  -  E(AwlAw 5 -a,)), 
where the expectations are taken with respect to the actual distribution of wage changes. This 
expression can be evaluated using estimates of the fractions of real wage changes in the upper and 
lower tails of  the observed wage-change distribution and estimates of the conditional mean wage 
changes in the two tails. A similar expression can be developed for wsb, in terms of the fractions 
of wage changes in the intervals [-a:,  c]  and [c,  2c + a,].  and the mean wage changes within 
these intervals. 90  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
Effects of  Measurement Error 
The nominal rigidity measures developed in equations 1-4  implicitly ignore 
any errors in reported wages. Random measurement errors will have several 
effects on the observed distribution of wage changes relative to the true under- 
lying distribution. Most notably, the observed fraction of  workers with rigid 
wages  will  be  lower than  the  true fraction.  In particular,  assuming that the 
observed wage in period t w, differs from the actual wage w,*  by an error u,, 
the observed wage change is 
Aw, = Aw,* + Au,. 
If  the distribution of true wage changes is continuous, apart from a spike at 
-IT,,  only individuals with truly rigid wages who accurately report their wage 
change contribute to observed rigidity. The fraction  of  individuals with ob- 
served wage rigidity is therefore 
P(Aw, = 0) = R  X  P(Aw,* = 0), 
where R = P(Au, = 01  Aw,* = 0) is the probability of accurately reporting the 
true wage change, conditional on rigid wages. We  are unaware of  any direct 
estimates of R. However, evidence from the January 1977 CPS validation sur- 
vey provides an indication of the magnitude of this probability. In that survey 
44% of hourly-rated workers report exactly the same wage as their employers 
report. Treating the employers’ reports as error free, this estimate suggests that 
R lies between 0.2 (  =0.442) and 0.44, depending on the persistence in individ- 
uals’ probabilities of making  an error-free  wage report.”’ If  employers have 
about the same probability of making an erroneous wage report as employees, 
however, then  this  estimate  suggests a range  for R  between  0.44 and 0.66 
(=0.441’2),  again depending on the persistence in the likelihood of making an 
error-free wage report. These estimates suggest that the observed fraction of 
rigid wages may understate the true rigidity rate by 30-80%. 
A second implication of measurement error is that the observed distribution 
of wage changes will tend to show less evidence of menu costs than the true 
distribution. Specifically,  suppose that  with  probability R individuals report 
their true wage change, and with probability  (1 -  R) they report  their true 
wage change plus a continuously distributed measurement error Au,. Then a 
fraction (1  ~  R) of the true mass at  -IT,  is transformed  into a distribution 
of observed wage changes centered on  -IT,  with the density function of hu,. 
Assuming that  Au, has a “bell-shaped”  distribution,  this  will  add relatively 
more mass to the observed distribution just to the left and right of  -IT,, par- 
tially “filling in” any deficit created by menu costs or rounding effects. 
30. If  the same individuals provide an error-free  wage report in consecutive years, then the 
probability of  an error-free wage change is 0.44. If the probability of an error-free wage report is 
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A third implication of measurement error, mentioned above, is that nominal 
rigidities in the lower half of the wage-change distribution may spill over to 
the upper half, leading to a violation of the assumption that observed wage 
changes above the median are unaffected by rigidities. In particular, the addi- 
tion of  a symmetric measurement error to a right-skewed distribution of true 
wage changes, such as illustrated in figure 2.4A, will tend to lead to a measured 
median above the true median wage change. 
Figure 2.5 displays the qualitative effects of measurement error on the ob- 
served distribution of wage changes. As illustrated in the figure, reporting er- 
rors attenuate the magnitude of the spike in the observed distribution at -IT,, 
while adding “shoulders” to either side of the spike. In the figure some of the 
displaced mass spills over above the median, causing an upward bias in the 
observed median relative to the true median. 
To get some idea of  the quantitative effect of measurement  errors on the 
accuracy of  our rigidity  measures,  we performed  a series of  simulations in 
which we added measurement errors to a distribution of  true wage changes 
like the one in figure 2.4B and then formed estimates of su, sb, wsu, and wsb. 
A complete description of the simulations is presented in appendix B, with a 
table showing the actual and estimated levels of  sweep-up (su),  sweep-back 
(sb)  and wage  sweep-up  (wsu). Although  limited in scope, the  simulations 
show that the addition of measurement error leads to downward biases in our 
estimates of downward rigidity  effects. The estimates of  wage sweep-up, for 
example, are downward biased by 10-30% under a plausible range of assump- 
tions. 
2.4.4  Kernel Density Estimates of the Actual and 
Counterfactual Distributions 
As a preliminary step in describing the extent of nominal rigidities in our 
CPS and PSID samples, we used standard kernel estimation techniques to con- 
struct smoothed estimates of  the densities of real wage changes, and corre- 
sponding estimates of the counterfactual densities. In contrast to simple histo- 
grams, which can display irregular “jumps,” kernel density methods compute 
a weighted average of the density near to each point. In particular, the kernel 
estimator for the density at some value x is 
nh ,=I 
where n is the number of observations, h is a bandwidth parameter (sometimes 
called the window width), and K(-)  is a kernel or weighting function, which 
integrates to  1 over the range of x.~’  The smoothed kernel estimates give a 
3 1. Silverman (1986) provides a full treatment of  the issues involved with density estimation. 
We estimate each of the densities of  250 equispaced points (x)  in the range (-0.35,  0.35) using 
an Epanechnikov kernel and a fixed bandwidth, h = 0.005. We also tried other bandwidths and 
found that the resulting distributions were qualitatively similar. 92  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
Fig. 2.5  Theoretical effect of measurement error on the distribution of real 
wage changes in the presence of menu costs and downward rigidities 
clearer picture of the differences between the actual and counterfactual distri- 
butions of wage changes than can be obtained using simple histograms. 
The actual and  median-counterfactual  densities  for the CPS samples are 
shown in  figure 2.6. As is true of  the  simple histograms  in  figure 2.1, the 
smoothed densities of  the observed data show noticeable spikes at the point 
corresponding to rigid nominal wages (i.e., at minus the inflation rate), with a 
larger spike in years with  lower inflation  rates. A comparison  of  the actual 
and counterfactual  distributions  shows a deficit  in the left tail  of  the  actual 
distribution, and a small but typically noticeable deficit to the right of the spike 
point. These two characteristics are consistent with the stylized graph in figure 
2.4B. The observed data seem to show both downward nominal rigidity effects 
and the presence of menu costs associated with small wage changes. 
To better pinpoint the differences between the actual and counterfactual dis- 
tributions, figure 2.7 presents graphs of the cumulative deviation between the 
two distributions at each point up to the median. For each wage change below 
the median, we compute the fraction of the actual distribution “missing” from 
the counterfactual  distribution between that point and  -T~.  Specifically, for 
each point below the spike (i.e., for each wage change Aw < -TJ,  we estimate 
Similarly, for each point between the spike and the median (i.e., for each wage 
change --rI  < Aw < mJ,  we estimate 
J-,+ 
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In practice, we set the limits of integration around the spike point to be -IT,-  = 
-IT, -  0.0025 and -IT:  = -IT,  + 0.0025. If nominal rigidities prevent some 
individuals’ real wages from falling faster than the inflation rate, then G(Aw) 
will be positive for all Aw < -IT,.  Indeed, in the simple case where a fixed 
fraction f  of real wage declines bigger than  -IT,  are prevented,  G(Aw)  will 
equalf. Similarly, to the extent that menu costs prevent some individuals’ nom- 
inal wages from rising, G(Aw)  will be positive for all -T,  <  Aw < m,. 
In figure 2.7 we have graphed the estimated G(Aw)  functions for each year 
after renormalizing the real wage changes in a particular year relative to the 
spike point. That is, we graph G(Aw + IT,), which is equivalent to graphing the 
deficits in the distributions of nominal wage changes. Inspection of the graphs 
suggests that in most years G(Aw) is roughly constant for Aw in the left-hand 
tail of the distribution, and in the range from one-quarter to one-half; below, 
but near to,  -IT,  the fraction displaced shows a sharp increase to one-half or 
more; and above -T,  G(Aw)  falls off steadily from about one-half. These pat- 
terns suggest that a substantial fraction of  wages are affected by downward 
nominal rigidity, and that, near to zero nominal change, menu costs may ac- 
count for at least one-half and perhaps more of observed rigidity. 
2.4.5  Estimates of the Effects of Nominal Rigidities 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present estimates of the four summary measures of the 
effect of nominal wage rigidity  (su,, sb,, wsu,, wsb,) defined by equations 1-4, 
using our CPS samples of hourly-rated non-job  changers. In implementing the 
formulas we restrict the upper  and  lower limit  of integration for real  wage 
changes to 50.3, in order to reduce the effect of any outliers in the extreme 
tails of the wage-change distributions. Table 2.3 contains estimates of the den- 
sity displacement effects su, and sb, for two choices of the point of symmetry: 
the median real wage change, and the 49th percentile real wage change. Recall 
that the latter is appropriate under the assumption that 2%  of potential wage 
change observations are missing because of employment responses to down- 
ward wage rigidity. 
Consider first the estimated sweep-up effects (su,) presented in columns 2 
and 3. Under the median counterfactual, nominal wage rigidities are estimated 
to affect between 5.4 and 7.3% of hourly-rated non-job  changers during the 
high-inflation years from 1979 to 1982, and between 9.7 and 13.5% of workers 
during the low-inflation period later in the sample. Using the 49th-percentile 
counterfactual the estimated effects are fairly similar: between 6.5 and 6.8% 
during the high-inflation  years, and between  10.6 and 14.5% during the low- 
inflation years. 
The estimated density sweep-back effects (sb,)  in columns 4 and 5 are gener- 
ally much smaller than the sweep-up effects, although in some years sweep- 
back accounts for up to one-third of total nominal rigidity. If the sweep-back 
effects are interpreted as estimates of the effect of menu costs to the right of 
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Fig. 2.6  Smoothed (kernel) estimates of actual and counterfactual densities of 
real wage changes, CPS samples from 1979-80 to 1992-93 
wage changes, then the difference (su, -  sb,) provides a lower-bound estimate 
of the fraction of people affected by downward nominal wage rigidities. In the 
mid- 1980s this fraction is around  10-1 2%. 
Simple regressions of our estimates of su, on the inflation rate in year t yield 
statistically significant coefficients of -0.81  and -0.97  using the median and 
49th-percentile  counterfactuals  respectively,  with  t-statistics of  4.1  and 4.9. 
Analogous regressions of the net sweep-up effects (su, -  sb,) on the inflation 
rate yield smaller and less significant coefficients of -0.44 and -0.73,  with t- 
statistics 1.3 and 2.2 These estimates suggest that higher inflation helps to re- 
duce the effect of downward nominal rigidities. A 5 percentage-point increase 
in the inflation rate is associated with a 2.2 to 5.0 percentage-point reduction 25 -I 
1981.82 
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Fig. 2.7  Cumulative fraction of counterfactual density affected by rigidities, 
CPS samples from 1979-80  to  1992-93 
in the fraction of nonmovers who are affected by downward nominal rigidity. 
As noted above, we suspect that this estimate is downward biased in magnitude 
to the extent that measured wage changes are incorrectly reported to the CPS. 
Table 2.4 contains the estimated wage effects wsu, and wsb, associated with 
nominal rigidities. These vary  over the sample period  with  larger effects in 
low-inflation years. Again, the estimates of  wsu, and wsb, from the median 
and 49th-percentile counterfactuals are fairly similar. The estimates imply that 
nominal rigidities raised the mean real wages of non-job  changers who would 
otherwise have suffered nominal wage declines by between 0.3 and 1.2%, with 98  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
Table 2.3  Estimated Fraction of Non-Job Changers Affected by Nominal 
Wage Rigidities 
~~ 
Density Swept-upd  Density Swept-backb 
Counterfactual  Counterfactual 
Inflation 
Rate  Median  49th Percentile  Median  49th Percentile 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1979-80 



















































































Norest Samples are based on matched CPS samples of hourly-rated workers who report thc same 
industry and occupation code in consecutive years, and whose wages are not affected by the mini- 
mum wage in either year. 
'Estimated  percentage of workers who would have experienced a nominal wage cut in the absence 
of  rigidities. 
bEstimated percentage of workers  who would have cxpcricnced a nominal  wage increase in the 
absence of rigidities. 
an average effect of about 1% in the low-inflation years of the mid-1980s. On 
the other hand,  nominal rigidities do not seem to have had a large negative 
effect on people whose nominal wages otherwise would have risen. The maxi- 
mum estimated wage sweep-back effect is 0.2%, and the estimates are typi- 
cally less than 0.1  %. On net, our estimates imply that nominal rigidities may 
have contributed to about  1  % higher average growth for hourly-rated non-job 
changers in the mid- I980s, with smaller effects in the earlier and later years of 
our sample period. 
One interesting question that the estimated sweep-up effects in tables 2.3 
and 2.4 do not address is how far down in the lower tail of the counterfactual 
wage-change  distribution  are  individuals  with  observed  rigid  wages  drawn 
from. For example, one might argue that the institutional forces that generate 
downward rigidities have limited power to resist large wage cuts. In this case, 
most of the measured sweep-up in table 2.3 should arise from the interval of 
real wage changes just below --T,.~*  Of course, if downward rigidities do pre- 
32. This ignores measurement errors in wage changes. Given an observed wage change in the 
lower tail of  the observed wage-change distribution, the best estimate of the true wage change is 
less negative. 99  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
Table 2.4  Estimated Effect of Nominal Wage Rigidities on Average Real 
Wage Changes 
Wage Swept-Up  Wage Swept-Back 
CounterfactuaP  Counterfactualb 
Inflation 
Rate  Median  49th Percentile  Median  49th Percentile 





















































































Notes; Samples are based on matched CPS samples of hourly-rated workers who report the same 
industry and occupation code in consecutive years, and whose wages are not affected by the mini- 
mum wage in either year. 
“Estimated  effect of  nominal rigidities on average real wage change for workers who otherwise 
would have experienced a nominal wage cut, expressed in percentages. 
bEstimated effect of nominal rigidities on average real wage change for workers who otherwise 
would  have experienced a nominal wage  increase, expressed in  percentages. A positive  entry 
means that rigidities reduced wages for this group. 
vent large wage cuts, we might expect some wage-change observations to be 
missing  from the  lower tail  of  the  distribution, consistent with  our 49th- 
percentile counterfactual. Appendix tables 2A.3 and 2A.4 decompose the esti- 
mates of  su, and wsu,  into fractions attributable to nominal wage changes in 
three intervals: less than a 10% cut, from a 10 to 20% cut, and more than a 
20% nominal cut. About 70% of the density swept up to the nominal rigidity 
spike is attributable to the interval of 0-10%  nominal cuts. Another 20% is 
attributable to nominal cuts of 10 to 20% and only 10% is attributable to nomi- 
nal cuts over 20%. The decomposition of wage sweep-up, however, is different, 
since wages swept up from farther in the tail contribute more to wsu,.  Indeed, 
roughly one-third of total estimated wage sweep-up is attributable to each of 
the three ranges. 
The  correlations of  the  estimated  wage  sweep-up (wsu,)  and  net  wage 
sweep-up (wsu, -  wsb,) effects with the aggregate inflation rate are negative 
and significant. Regressions of  wsu, and (wsu,  -  wsb,) on the corresponding 
inflation rates over the fourteen-year sample period yield coefficient estimates 
between -0.057  and -0.079,  with t-statistics between 1.8 and 2.5. These esti- 
mates imply that a rise in the inflation rate from 3% to 8% is associated with 100  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
about 0.3% slower real average wage growth for non-job  changers. We  con- 
clude that downward nominal wage rigidities exert a small but measurable ef- 
fect on average wage growth, with a bigger effect in low-inflation years. Again, 
evidence from our simulations suggest that, if anything, these estimates may 
be downward biased in magnitude by the effects of reporting errors in the CPS 
wage data. 
The conclusion that lower inflation rates increase the incidence of downward 
rigidity provides one possible insight into the “fact” that individuals seem to dis- 
like inflation (see Shiller, chap. 1 in this volume). Our estimates suggest that a 
lower inflation rate acts like a higher “minimum wage” for the rate of growth of 
real wages. Indeed, the similarity between the histograms in figures 2.1 and 2.2 
and histograms of real wage levels in the presence of a binding minimum wage 
is remarkable. The data in figure 2.7 suggest that between one-quarter and one- 
half of non-job  changers who might have expected a nominal wage cut in the 
absence of any rigidities instead have rigid nominal wages. If workers have an 
implicit “guarantee” that their real wage will fall by no more than the inflation 
rate, their preference for a lower inflation rate is understandable. 
2.5  Market-Level Evidence 
While our analysis of individual wage data provides reasonably strong evi- 
dence that nominal rigidities affect the underlying distribution of  real wage 
changes, much of the interest in nominal rigidities focuses at a higher level of 
aggregation. In this section we therefore examine the evidence that state-level 
average real wages fall more quickly in response to a given level of labor mar- 
ket slack in periods of high inflation than in periods of low inflation. 
As a point of  departure, consider a collection of  workers indexed by  i in 
some local labor market j.  Let U, represent a measure of slack in market j  in 
some period (e.g., the difference between a market demand shock and a market 
supply shock). Suppose that, in the absence of rigidities, 
AwU = b’UJ+ E,~, 
where Aw,, is the real wage change for individual  i in market j  (over some 
specific time horizon) and E,~  is a random term reflecting idiosyncratic factors. 
In the presence of downward nominal rigidities, suppose that a fraction f of 
nominal wage cuts required by equation 5 do not take place: 
(6) Aw,~  = b’U,  +  b*U, + E~,  > -T 
=  (-T)  + (1 -  I,J)  (b*UJ  + etJ),  b*UJ + E~~ < -T, 
where  is a random indicator variable with meanJ3’ Equation 6 implies that 
a regression of  the average wage change observed in market j  on the slack 
variable U, has a coefficient that varies with the aggregate inflation rate: 
33. Formally, equation 6 is a Tobit model with random censoring at  -T. 101  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
(7)  E(Aw,~IU,,  T)  = a(T)  + b(~)  -  U,, 
with a smaller coefficient b(.rr),  the lower the inflation rate and the higher the 
fraction f  of  individuals affected by  downward rigidities. If  the measure of 
labor market slack is the unemployment rate, then equation 7 implies that the 
“cross-sectional Phillips curve” is $utter in periods with low inflation than in 
periods with high inflation. 
To test this prediction, we used individual microdata from the March CPS 
files from 1977 to 1992 to construct estimates of the average wage of workers 
in each state from 1976 to 1991. Specifically, we constructed two estimates of 
the average hourly wage for each state in each year: a simple average, and an 
adjusted average that accounts for differences in the observed characteristics 
of the workers in each state.34  We then fit a variety of models of the form 
w,,  -  wjr-, = a,  + b,  log UiI + eir, 
where w,,  is the average wage index for state j  in year t, a, represents a year 
dummy, UJI  is the measured unemployment rate in the state in year t, and eft 
represents a residual. Finally, we analyzed the covariation between b, (the slope 
coefficient in year t)  and the inflation rates between years t -  1 and t. 
Two aspects of  the specification in equation 8 deserve comment. First, equa- 
tion 8 describes the change in the average wage, while equation 7 describes 
the average individual-level wage change. In the absence of  selection biases 
associated with nonrandom movements in and out of the labor market, this is 
not a problem, since with a fixed population E(Aw,) = E(wlJ,)  -  E(w,~~-,)  (tak- 
ing expectations over individuals in state  j).  While there is some evidence of a 
cyclical component in the gap between the average wage change for continuing 
workers and the change in average wages for all workers (see Solon, Barsky, 
and Parker 1994), this issue is somewhat less important in our application be- 
cause an individual has to be unemployed (or out of  the labor force) for an 
entire year in order not to have a wage in the March CPS data. 
Second, although equation 8 is consistent with the original formulation of 
the Phillips curve, it is inconsistent with the formulation of the so-called wage 
curve recently popularized by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). In particular, 
Blanchflower and Oswald argue that the wage level in  a local labor market 
depends on the unemployment rate, while equation 8 implies that the rate of 
change of wages depends on the unemployment rate. A simple way to compare 
the two alternatives is to introduce the lagged unemployment rate into equation 
8. If the correct model specifies the level of wages as a function of the level of 
unemployment, then the first difference of wages will depend on current and 
34. To  construct the adjusted average, we first estimated a wage-prediction equation for each 
year that included various observable characteristics (education, labor market experience, dum- 
mies for race, gender, Hispanic status) as well as dummies for each state of residence. We then 
used the coefficients to predict a wage for each individual, assuming that the individual lived in 
California. Finally, we constructed the average deviation of the observed wage from the predicted 
wage: this is our adjusted average (log) wage. 102  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
lagged unemployment with  equal and  opposite coefficients. If  the correct 
model specifies the rate of growth of wages as a function of the unemployment 
rate,  then  lagged unemployment will have  an insignificant effect on wage 
growth.35 
Some evidence on this specific issue, and on the general performance of 
equation 8, is presented in appendix table 2A.5 where we summarize the re- 
sults of estimating various versions of equation 8 without allowing the coefi- 
cient b to vary across years. In brief, the estimates suggest that wage growth 
is fairly responsive to local unemployment: a doubling of the unemployment 
typically reduces the rate of  wage growth by  1.7-2.4%  per year. Moreover, 
consistent with the specification of  the conventional Phillips curve, but con- 
trary to the wage-curve approach, lagged valued of local unemployment exert 
no significant effect on wage growth. These conclusions are robust to minor 
changes in specification, including the addition of dummies capturing perma- 
nent differences in wage growth across regions or states, the introduction of 
region  times  year  effects  capturing  region-specific  cycles,  alternative 
weighting  schemes, and the use of  raw  versus adjusted average wages for 
each state. 
Using these findings, we proceeded to estimate a series of models that ex- 
clude lagged unemployment, but allow the coefficient on current unemploy- 
ment to vary  across years. Estimates of  the critical coefficients 6, from five 
such specifications are reported in table 2.5. For reference, the top row in the 
table gives the estimates of the unemployment slopes from identical specifica- 
tions when the slope b, is constrained to be constant across years. The year- 
specific estimates of 6,  are then tabulated, along with the estimated coefficients 
from simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the estimated b,s on 
the inflation rate. Across the different specifications there is a tendency for 
unemployment to exert a bigger (more negative) effect on local wage determi- 
nation in high inflation years. However, the correlation of b, and T,  is weak: 
the biggest t-ratio (for the model in column 4) is around one. 
The estimates in the bottom row of table 2.5 imply that a 5 percentage-point 
increase in inflation leads to an increase in the magnitude of the slope coeffi- 
cient relating wage growth to local unemployment of between 0 and 0.012. To 
understand the implications of these estimates, suppose that b, = -0.034  in an 
average year (as in column 2 of table 2.5). Then real wage growth is about 2.3 
percentage points per year slower in a state with an 8% unemployment rate 
than in a state with a 4% unemployment rate. Raising the inflation rate by  5 
percentage points would widen this gap by  an additional 0 to 0.7 percentage 
35. It is also possible to formulate a test based on a model for the level of wages. Specifically, 
the wage-curve hypothesis suggests that only the current unemployment rate affects the level of 
wages (controlling for state effects), while the Phillips-curve specification implies that lagged 
unemployment terms enter in the model with equal (negative) coefficients. Our findings from this 
approach are consistent with the results based on a model in first-differences. Table 2.5  Estimated Effects of State Unemployment on Real Wage Growth 
Additional Control Variables Included in Models 
Year &  Year X  Year &  Year  X Region 
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Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Models are estimated on sample of 756 state times year 
observations. See note to table 2A.5. 
“Estimated  effect of unemployment on wage growth in model with constant coefficient. 
“Estimated  effects of unemployment on wage growth in model with year-specific coefficients. 
‘Estimated coefficient from OLS regression of year-specific unemployment effects on annual in- 
flation rate (change in log CPI-U-XI). 104  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
The upper range of this interval represents a sizeable increase in the 
“flexibility”  of  wages to local demand conditions  between  a low- and high- 
inflation regime. However, the imprecise nature of our estimates makes it im- 
possible to distinguish such a possibility from the alternative that higher infla- 
tion has no effect on the rate of relative wage adjustment. 
2.6  Conclusions 
A traditional  concern about very  low inflation is that  nominal  wages  are 
downward rigid. In this paper we have attempted to assemble two types of 
evidence  on the extent of  such rigidities:  microlevel evidence  based  on the 
distribution  of  individual-specific  wage changes; and market-level evidence 
based on the rate of  adjustment of average real wages in a state to the state 
unemployment  rates. Our microanalysis  reveals three key insights. First, al- 
though  many  individuals  experience (measured) nominal  wage  reductions 
from one year to the next, there is a substantial spike at zero in the distribution 
of nominal wage changes. Second, the magnitude of this spike is very highly 
correlated with inflation. In the high-inflation era of the late 1970s, 6-10%  of 
workers with the same job reported exactly the same wage from one year to 
the next. In the low-inflation era of the mid-l980s, this fraction rose to over 
15%. Third, informal and formal analyses suggest that most (but not all) of 
workers with rigid nominal wages would have had an even bigger decline in 
their real wage in the absence of rigidities. For the mid-1980s we estimate that 
downward nominal rigidities may have “held up” average real wages by  1% 
per year. 
Our market-level analysis of real wage responses to local unemployment is 
less conclusive. As previous  researchers  have noted, real  wages  grow more 
quickly in local labor markets with low unemployment,  and decline in local 
labor markets with high unemployment.  In principle, the existence of down- 
ward nominal rigidities implies that the rate of adjustment to negative shocks 
will be faster, the higher the aggregate inflation rate. Empirically, however, we 
find only weak evidence of such an effect. Based on both types of evidence, 
we  conclude that  the overall impact of  nominal  wage rigidities  is probably 
modest. 
36. An  increase in the unemployment rate from 4% to 8% is a 0.69 point change in the log 
unemployment rate. Multiplying this by  the baseline coefficient estimate (-0.034)  implies a 2.3 
percentage-point reduction in the growth of log wages. The coefficients in the bottom row of table 
2.5 imply that a 5 percentage-point increase in the inflation rate will raisc the absolute magnitude 
of the unemployment coefficient by  from 0.002 to 0.010, leading to a net unemployment coeffi- 
cient of -0.036  to -0.044.  In this case, the effect of doubling the unemployment rate is to slow 
the rate of growth of wages by  from 2.5 to 3.0 percentage points per year. 105  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
Appendix A 
Data Description and Sources 
This appendix describes the construction of our matched CPS panels. We begin 
with the merged monthly  “outgoing rotation  group” files that pool the CPS 
sample observations in the two outgoing rotation groups (rotation groups 4 and 
8) of each month of a given calendar year. The CPS sample design implies that 
households in rotation group 4 in a given month will be in rotation group 8 in 
the same month in the next year. For example, in the 1979 CPS sample there 
are 164,626 individuals age sixteen and older in rotation group 4, drawn from 
80,557 uniquely identified households. All of  these individuals were poten- 
tially reinterviewed in 1980. Since the CPS sample frame is based on physical 
addresses, rather than specific individuals or families, any family that moves 
between  1979 and 1980 is “replaced” in the sample by the family that moves 
into their old housing unit. Moreover, individuals who move out of a family 
are not tracked to their new address. Finally, since the CPS does not assign 
unique person identifiers to individuals within households, there is some slip- 
Table 2A.1  Matched CPS Sample Selection 
Total Number of  . . .  And 
Hourly-rated Workers  % with Same  Unaffected by 
Year  in Matched CPS Sample  Industry & Occupationa  Minimum Wageb 
1979-80 
1980-81 






















































’The  industry and  occupations  are matched using detailed (two-digit) industry and occupation 
codes for all years except 1982-83,  1983-84,  and  1988-89.  Matching for the 1983-84  sample is 
based on three-digit  1980 census codes; for the 1982-83  sample, the industry is matched using 
the detailed (two-digit) codes which are comparable across years, while occupation was matched 
using an  algorithm devised to convert  1970 census three-digit  occupation codes to their  1980 
census counterparts;  and for the  1988-89  sample, occupation was  matched using the detailed 
codes, and an algorithm was devised to match the detailed industry codes. The matching algo- 
rithms used for the 1982-83 and  1988-89  samples are available from the authors on request. 
bObservations are assumed to be affected by  minimum wage effects if either w,. , 5  max (mw,_,  , 
mw,),  or w, 5  mw,. 106  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
Table 2A.2  PSID Sample Selection 
Total Number of 
Workers in  % Hourly-rated 
Year  4-Year Panel  with Same Employer" 
1976-77  1,965 
1977-78  1,992 
1978-79  2,214 
1985-86  4,507 
1986-87  4,447 







"Workers  are treated as having changed employer if their reported tenure, in months, is less than 
the number of months since their previous interview. During 1976-79,  tenure relates to time in the 
same position, while during 1985-88,  tenure relates to time with the same employer. 
Table 2A.3  Decomposition of Density Sweep-Up over the Range of Nominal 
Wage Changes 
Density Swept-up Froma 
Wage Changes  Wage Changes 
Inflation  All Negative  between  between  Wage Changes 
Year  Rate  Wage Changes  -0.1  & 0  -0.2  & -0.1  < -0.20 
1979-80 
1980-8 1 


















































































Note: Samples are based on matched CPS samples of hourly-rated workers who report the same 
industry and occupation code in consecutive years, and whose wages are not affected by the mini- 
mum wage in either year. 
"Computed assuming "median" counterfactual wage-change distributions. 
page in matching if an individual misreports a key characteristic (like race or 
age), or if  a household  contains  two very  similar people.  These limitations 
imply that about 25-30% of individuals are unmatchable. 
We  matched  individuals in rotation group 4 of  year t with individuals in 107  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
Table 2A.4  Decomposition of Wage Sweep-Up over the Range of Nominal 
Wage Changes 
Density Swept-up From” 
Wage Changes  Wage Changes 
Inflation  All Negative  between  between  Wage Changes 
Year  Rate  Wage Changes  -0.1  & 0  -0.2  & -0.1  < -0.20 
1979-80  10.6  0.54  0.19  0.2 1  0.14 
1980-8 I  9.1  0.35  0.17  0.06  0.12 
1981-82  5.9  0.25  0.18  0.08  -0.01 
1982-83  4.1  0.75  0.18  0.27  0.29 
1983-84  4.2  0.81  0.27  0.31  0.24 
1984-85  3.5  0.93  0.24  0.28  0.40 
1985-86  1.8  0.87  0.39  0.30  0.18 
1986-87  3.6  1.17  0.36  0.32  0.49 
1987-88  4.1  1.13  0.33  0.44  0.36 
1988-89  4.7  1.10  0.33  0.40  0.36 
1989-90  5.3  0.93  0.28  0.32  0.33 
1990-9  1  4.  I  0.71  0.25  0.37  0.09 
199 1-92  3.0  0.71  0.26  0.25  0.19 
1992-93  2.9  0.72  0.23  0.28  0.21 
Nore: Samples are based on matched CPS samples of hourly-rated workers who report the same 
industry and occupation code in consecutive years, and whose wages are not affected by the mini- 
mum wage in either year. 
Computed assuming “median” counterfactual wage-change distributions. 
rotation group 8 in year t + 1 by household identity number, interview month, 
sex, race, ethnicity, and age. We allowed for errors in age of plus or minus one 
year in the matching algorithm (this gives about 6% more successful matches 
than a strict requirement that age increments by one). The overall match rates 
are between 70 and 75% in every year except 1984-85  and 1985-86.  For ex- 
ample, 74.5% of the 164,626 individuals in rotation group 4 of the 1979 sam- 
ple are successfully matched to a 1980 observation, and 74.4% of the 164,942 
individuals in rotation group 4 of the 1992 sample are successfully matched to 
a 1993 observation. In July 1985 the CPS implemented a new sample frame: 
only individuals in the January-June  1985 CPS are matchable to observations 
in 1984, and only individuals in the October-December  1985 CPS are match- 
able to observations in 1986. These limitations lead to much lower match rates 
for  1984-85  (37.0%  of  all individuals  in  the  1984 sample) and  1985-86 
(18.3% of all individuals in the 1985 sample). Table 2A.5  Estimated Models for the First-Difference of State-Average Log 
Wages, 1976-91 
Estimated Coefficients of Log State 
Unemployment Rate  Residual 
Standard  Other Controls 
Dependent Variable  Current  Lag 1  Lag 2  Lag 3  Error  Included 
Adjusted log wage 
(weighted) 
Adjusted log wage 
(weighted) 
Adjusted log wage 
(weighted) 
Adjusted log wage 
(weighted) 
Adjusted log wage 
(weighted) 
Adjusted log wage 
(weighted) 
Adjusted log wage 
(weighted) 
Unadjusted log wage 
(weighted) 


















































year and region 
year and region 
year X region effects 
year X region effects 
year and region 





Notes: All models are fit to sample of 765 observations (5  1 states times 15 year-to-year changes). 
The dependent variable is the change from year f -  1 to year f in the state average wage, derived 
from March CPS data for all individuals who worked positive weeks and reported positive eam- 
ings (age 16-68).  In all but one row, the state average wage is adjusted for the characteristics of 
workers in the state (using a year-specific wage prediction model). In all but one row, the estimates 
are obtained by  weighted OLS, using as weights the relative number of workers in the state in 
1976. Standard errors are in parentheses. 1-  I- 
05 -  "5 - 
Fig. 2A.1 
1976-79and1985-88 
Histograms of real wage changes for all workers in PSID samples, 1985  87 
1917-74 
B:  3-years 
,976-19 
-3  -7  -1  2  I  2  3 
"5 - 
Fig. 2A.2 
over two-year and three-year horizons, 1976-79 and 1985-88 
Histograms of real wage changes for all workers in PSID samples, 111  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
Appendix B 
Simulations of  the Effect of Measurement Error 
This appendix describes the simulations we used to evaluate the effect of mea- 
surement error on our estimates of sweep-up, sweep-back, wage sweep-up, and 
wage sweep-back. The simulations all begin with an underlying distribution of 
real wage changes in the absence of any rigidities.  We  assume that this is a 
normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation 0.12. The standard 
deviation of 0.12 is based on estimates of the dispersion in the upper half of 
the distribution of  observed real wage changes in our CPS samples. To this 
underlying distribution we then  add downward  rigidities  affecting a fraction 
of workers who would otherwise receive a nominal wage cut, and menu-cost 
rigidities  affecting  some  individuals  who  would  otherwise  experience  a 
“small” nominal wage change. Finally, we added a simple model of measure- 
ment error:  with probability R the measurement error in the observed wage 
change is zero; with probability (1 -  R)  the measurement error is drawn from 
a normal distribution with mean zero. 
In all simulations we adjusted the  standard deviation of the measurement 
error component so that the overall contribution of measurement errors to the 
variance of observed real wage changes is 20%. Most available evidence sug- 
gests  that  this  is probably  a  lower  bound  on  the  share  of  observed  wage 
changes attributable to reporting errors (see, e.g., McLaughlin  1994). How- 
ever, even  large changes  in  the  fraction  of  the  variance  of  observed  wage 
changes attributable to measurement error have relatively  little effect in our 
simulations, holding constant the probability of  an  accurately reported wage 
change (R). 
We  modeled the effect of menu costs as follows. For all observations that 
would otherwise obtain an absolute nominal wage change Aw of less than or 
equal to g, we assume that a fraction 0.5( 1 -  lAwl/g) have rigid nominal wages. 
We set g to either 0.03 or 0.06. 
In the simulation model the rate of measured wage rigidity at any inflation 
rate is determined by three factors: the fraction of workers affected by  down- 
ward nominal rigidities (i.e., the fraction “swept up”); the fraction affected by 
menu  costs; and the fraction of individuals who accurately report  their true 
wage change (R).  We developed three scenarios that combine these factors so 
as to generate observed rigidity rates of about 8-9%  at 10% inflation and ob- 
served rigidity rates of 12-14%  at 5% inflation. One of these combines a rela- 
tively high estimate of  R  (0.66) with  a midrange estimate of  the probability 
that a nominal wage cut is affected by  downward rigidity (0.5) and a narrower 
range of menu costs (53%).  The second combines a higher rate of menu-cost 
rigidity with a more moderate estimate of R (0.50). The third assumes a very 
high probability of downward rigidity, conditional on a negative nominal wage 
change (0.7). Table 2B.1  Evaluation of Estimated Rigidity Effects in Presence of Measurement Errors 
Probability of 
Width of Interval  Downward  Probability of 
Affected by  Nominal  No Error  Inflation 




0.50  0.66  0.10 
0.05 
0.02 
0.50  0.50  0.10 
0.05 
0.02 
0.70  0.50  0.10 
0.05 
0.02 
Based on True Wage 
Changes, Fraction 
Affected by  Based on Observed Wage Changes 
Menu  Downward  True 
Costs  Rigidity  wsu 
Scenario 1 
0.035  0.093 
0.046  0.157 
0.049  0.206 
0.071  0.087 
0.091  0.147 
0.097  0.191 
0.035  0.130 
0.046  0.223 










0.0  19 
0.027 
Fraction 
Rigid  su  sb  W'SU 
0.087  0.081  0.006  0.007 
0.136  0.123  0.013  0.010 
0.169  0.153  0.015  0.014 
0.079  0.069  0.010  0.005 
0.119  0.100  0.018  0.009 
0.143  0.135  0.008  0.013 
0.083  0.087  -0.003  0.007 
0.134  0.130  0.003  0.013 
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Table 2B.1 summarizes the true and observed nominal rigidity effects under 
each scenario at three different inflation rates (lo%,  5%,  and 2%). In scenario 
1, which has a “high”  value  of R, the true fraction  of  workers affected by 
downward rigidity varies from 9 to 21%, and between 3.5 and 5% of workers 
are affected by menu costs. The true wage sweep-up effect is relatively modest, 
ranging from 0.7 to 1.9%. (The wage sweep-back effects are uniformly close 
to zero in all our simulations and are not shown.) Depending on the inflation 
rate, the observed density displacement  and wage effects in this scenario are 
downward biased by 0-30%. 
In scenario 2, which has a “high” fraction of workers affected by menu costs 
and/or rounding, the true sweep up effects are (virtually) the same as in sce- 
nario  1 and the measured effects are also similar. (The sweep-up effects are 
just slightly smaller in scenario 2 than scenario 1 because we first allow the 
effect of menu costs and then impose downward rigidities. With more rigidity 
attributable to menu  costs, the net effect of  downward rigidity is lessened.) 
Finally, in scenario 3, which has a “high” probability of downward rigidity for 
those who would  otherwise experience wage cuts, the true sweep-up effects 
are slightly larger but the measured effects are about the same as in the other 
scenarios, implying slightly larger downward biases. 
The last column of table 2B.1 shows the ratio of estimated  wage sweep- 
up to true wage  sweep-up. Note that estimated wage  sweep-up  is typically 
downward-biased by 20-30%,  with a larger bias the lower the inflation rate. 
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Comment  John Shea 
Many economists believe that nominal labor market frictions cause excessive 
employment  fluctuations.  One often-mentioned  type of  nominal  friction  is 
downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR), in which workers are either un- 
willing to accept reductions in nominal wages, or resent nominal wage cuts so 
much that firms optimally do not try to impose them. To  see how DNWR can 
generate excessive  employment  volatility, consider figure 2C.  1, which  plots 
labor demand and supply curves relating employment (L)  to the real wage (W). 
Under DNWR, workers will not work for less than last period’s nominal wage, 
so labor supply becomes infinitely elastic at a real wage of w(t -  1)/( 1 + T), 
where n  is this period’s inflation rate and w(t - 1) is last period’s real wage. 
Evidently,  labor-demand  shifts  generate  excessive  employment  volatility 
whenever labor demand intersects  the flat portion  of  labor supply-that  is, 
whenever the downward constraint on nominal wages binds. 
Now consider figure 2C.2, which  shows how DNWR interacts with infla- 
tion. When inflation is low, labor supply flattens at a high real wage, and exces- 
sive employment fluctuations are likely. When inflation is high, however, labor 
supply does not flatten until the real wage is low, and excessive employment 
fluctuations are less likely. This is the sense in which  inflation  “greases the 
wheels of the labor market” under DNWR-by  making a wider range of real 
wage outcomes acceptable to workers, inflation can prevent excessive employ- 
ment responses to negative labor-demand shocks.  ’ 
David Card and Dean Hyslop’s paper uses two methods to assess the empiri- 
cal significance of downward nominal wage rigidity for the United States. The 
first  method  examines the  distribution  of  individual  wage changes in U.S. 
microeconomic data. The second method examines the interaction between the 
inflation  rate  and the slope of  the Phillips curve, using panel  data for U.S. 
states. I will discuss each method in turn. 
John Shea is associate professor of economics at the University of Maryland, College Park, and 
a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
1, This discussion ignores the question of why workers would accept declining real wages im- 
posed by inflation hut would not accept declining real wages imposed by nominal wage cuts. One 
possibility, of course, is that workers suffer from nominal illusion. Tobin (1972) suggests instead 
that workers care about relative wages in addition to absolute wages, and that workers rationally 
believe that inflation is more likely than nominal wage cuts to spread the pain across all workers 
equally. W 
w(t-1y1 +  7 
Fig. 2C.1 
S 
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Method One: Wage Distributions 
If wages are downwardly rigid, then the distribution of workers’ observed 
real wage changes should be skewed to the right, the more so the lower is the 
inflation rate. The first part of the paper tests this implication of  DNWR by 
examining reported year-to-year real wage changes in the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).2 The authors 
begin  by  constructing  a counterfactual  wage-change distribution that would 
hold in the absence of  wage rigidity; this distribution is constructed by taking 
a mirror image of the upper half of the observed distribution. The authors then 
use the shortfall in the nominal-wage-cut region of the observed distribution 
relative to the counterfactual  to estimate the fraction of  workers whose real 
wages are propped up by DNWR (the “sweep up”), as well as the impact of 
DNWR on aggregate wage growth. The authors find that nominal wage cuts 
are not rare;  the  fraction of hourly-rated  CPS workers reporting  a nominal 
wage cut ranges from 11.6% in  1979-80  to 20.3% in  1992-93.  Despite this, 
there is still some evidence of DNWR; averaging over the year-by-year results 
in table 2.3, the authors find that 10.6% of  sample workers have their wages 
propped up in a typical year. As expected, DNWR binds more when inflation 
is low; the sweep up is 6.20% in  1980-81,  but  13.85% in  1987-88.  Overall, 
the  authors  find  that  the  economic impact of  DNWR  is small; eliminating 
downward rigidity would have reduced real wage growth by  only 0.78% per 
year between  1979 and 1993. 
While Card and Hyslop’s conclusions-downward  rigidity exists, but it does 
not exert a very large impact on the labor market-accord  with my priors, I 
have some concerns with the details of their methodology. In particular, there 
are three potential reasons why the authors’ numbers might not reflect the true 
impact of DNWR on the U.S. economy. 
First, Card and Hyslop’s baseline sample is restricted to hourly workers who 
do not switch jobs from one year to the next. But hourly stayers make up only 
half of  the working population.’  Including job switchers and salaried workers 
would raise the authors’ estimates of wage flexibility and reduce the estimated 
impact of DNWR. For instance, Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1995) exam- 
ine the distribution of  individual wage changes in the PSID. They find that 
11.9% of  hourly stayers experience nominal wage cuts in a typical year, com- 
pared to 19.3% of all workers, 17.8% of all stayers, and 24.8% of movers. They 
find that 9.7% of hourly wage stayers have their wages swept up in a typical 
year, compared to 7.4% of  all workers, 6.8% of all stayers, and 5.1% of  all 
movers. These figures suggest that the authors’ sample-selection criteria cause 
them  to overstate the average  sweep-up by  about 30% (9.7  divided  by  7.4 
2. Other recent studies examining the distribution of individual wage changes include McLaugh- 
lin  1994, Kahn  1995, and Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher 1995, the last of which is the closest to 
the present paper. 
3. These figures are based on table  1  in Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher 1995. 117  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
equals 1.3  1).4 The authors’ sample may also overstate the sensitivity of sweep- 
up with respect to inflation; for instance, Lebow et al.’s regression of sweep- 
up on inflation  yields a coefficient of  -0.75  (with a t-statistic of  -2.5)  for 
hourly stayers, but only -0.35  (- 1.2) for all stayers. 
Second, the authors assume that the wage distribution would be symmetric 
absent DNWR. This assumption is obviously important to the quantitative re- 
sults; if the counterfactual were assumed to be negatively skewed, for instance, 
the gap between  the counterfactual  and reality would be larger and the esti- 
mated impact of DNWR would  be greater. To my knowledge,  there is little 
evidence available on the shape of the distribution of microlevel shocks in the 
US.  economy. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), however, show the plant-level 
job destruction is much more cyclical than plant-level job creation-job  de- 
struction  rises  much more sharply  in  recessions  than job creation  rises  in 
booms, This suggests that  plant-level  shocks may be negatively  skewed, at 
least during recessions. On the other hand, the shock distribution and the wage 
distribution need not look alike. In particular, even if wages are flexible down- 
ward, bad microshocks would presumably in many cases lead to voluntary sep- 
arations rather than wage cuts (McLaughlin 1991), which would counteract 
negative skewness in the shocks and could even create positive skewness in 
the wage distribution.  Obviously, we need more evidence on the distribution 
of microlevel shocks and the determinants of voluntary separations before we 
can assess whether a symmetric counterfactual is plausible or not. 
Third,  Card and  Hyslop’s  calculations assume that  individuals’  reported 
nominal wages are accurate. There is good reason to believe that individually 
reported nominal wages contain measurement error; for instance, the authors 
cite a January 1977 CPS survey in which employees and their employers agree 
on the wage only 44% of the time. As the authors show in appendix B, mea- 
surement error in the level of wages can cause their methodology to understate 
effects of DNWR considerably. One channel that the authors do not emphasize, 
but that seems important to me, is that measurement error might cause the data 
to vastly overstate the true fraction of workers receiving nominal wage cuts. I 
have heard several colleagues express disbelief at the notion that between 10 
and 20% of hourly stayers experience nominal wage cuts from one year to the 
next. To see whether measurement error could explain such a result, I perform 
some calculations using a small sample of union workers from the PSID. In 
Shea (1993, I combine PSID information on individuals’ industry, occupation, 
union affiliation, and county of residence with outside information about pat- 
tern bargaining, contract settlements, and the location of particular employers 
to match individual PSID household heads to the provisions of particular long- 
4. In truth, Card and Hyslop’s figures are probably not off by a$ much as 30%. The authors work 
primarily with CPS data, in which the distinction between movers and stayers is not as precise as 
in  the PSID; thus, the authors’ sample already includes some movers. Also, Card and  Hyslop 
provide evidence contrary to the finding in Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1995) that salaries are 
more flexible than wages. 118  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
Table 2C.1  Percentage of Workers with Nominal Wage Cuts 
Year  Sample Size  Contract  Reported 
1981-82  79  0  11.4 
1982-83  69  5.8  11.6 
1983-84  55  1.8  25.5 
1984-85  59  0  16.9 
1985-86  57  0  35.1 
1986-87  60  0  31.7 
term union contracts. Here, I consider a subset of the sample from Shea (1995) 
for which hourly wages are reported at both t and t + 1, and for which reported 
tenure at time t + 1 is greater than twelve months. These restrictions leave 379 
observations, ranging from 198  1-82  through  1986-87. 
Table 2C.1 reports statistics on nominal wage cuts for my sample, broken 
down by year. For each year, I report the number of observations, the percent- 
age of observations whose published union settlements imposed nominal wage 
cuts, and the percentage  of observations reporting  nominal wage cuts in the 
PSID.5 The figures are startling; overall, I find that only  1.3% of my sample 
observations have “true” nominal wage cuts according to their contracts, but 
that 21.1% of my sample report nominal wage cuts. Taken literally, these re- 
sults suggest  that  measurement error could  explain  all  of  the evidence for 
downward nominal wage flexibility found in Card and Hyslop’s sample. It is 
possible,  of  course,  that  contract information  understates  the incidence  of 
“true” nominal wage cuts. For instance, contemporaneous accounts in the Bu- 
reau of  Labor Statistics’ Current Wage Developments indicate that some un- 
ionized trucking companies deviated from the trucking pattern bargain during 
the  1980s and imposed  nominal  wage cuts in the face of  competition  from 
nonunion companies. For robustness,  I redid my experiment excluding truck- 
ers, and found that the gap between the reported and published  incidence of 
nominal wage cuts was virtually unchanged (1.6 versus 21.0%). Another possi- 
bility is that my findings reflect the fact that senior union workers whose posi- 
tions have been eliminated are typically allowed to “bump” less senior workers 
at the next highest pay rung, who in turn can move down a pay rung and bump 
even less senior workers, and so on.6 I know of no data on the fraction of union 
workers  who are bumped in a typical  year. I would note, however, that the 
incidence of reported nominal wage cuts was lower during the 1982-83  reces- 
sion  than  during the  subsequent recovery,  which  seems inconsistent  with 
5. Hourly wages in the PSID are reported as of the time of  interview. Since almost all PSID 
interviews occur during the spring, I compute “contract” wage changes over the interval April  I, 
year r through March 31, year t + 1. Contract wage changes are estimated using union settlement 
information published in various issues of the Bureau of Labor Statistics periodical Current Wage 
Develupments and in the Burcau of National Affairs periodical Government Employee Relations 
Reporter: Contract wage changes include any changes imposed as a result of unexpected ex post 
contract renegotiations or reopenings. 
6. I thank Chris Erickson and the authors for independently pointing out this possibility to me. 119  Does Inflation “Grease the Wheels of the Labor Market”? 
bumping being responsible for the bulk of reported nominal wage cuts in my 
sample. I also redid my experiment separating workers who report changing 
occupations from workers who do not; the incidence of reported nominal wage 
cuts among occupation switchers was only slightly higher (21.4%) than among 
occupation stayers (21  .O%).  Given that bumped workers should have a higher 
incidence of occupation switches than unbumped job stayers, this result again 
suggests that bumping is not very important in my sample. 
My conclusion from this section is that it is difficult to say how important 
DNWR is to the labor market using the distribution of individual wage changes 
alone. We can adjust Card and Hyslop’s sweep-up estimates to account for the 
exclusion of movers and salaried workers rather easily. But with existing data, 
it is hard to say how much we should adjust the authors’ estimates for measure- 
ment error or for asymmetry in the counterfactual distribution. 
Method Two: Phillips Curves 
Given the problems  with using individual wage distributions, the authors 
should be commended for formulating an alternative  approach to estimating 
the impact of DNWR on the labor market. Recall from figures 2C.1 and 2C.2 
that DNWR increases (decreases) the sensitivity of employment (wages) to 
labor-demand shocks, the more so the lower is the inflation rate. In the latter 
part of their paper, Card and Hyslop test this implication by looking for interac- 
tions between inflation and the slope of the Phillips curve in the United States. 
Since such interactions would probably be impossible to detect in aggregate 
data, the authors cleverly  exploit cross-state variation  in unemployment  and 
wage  growth  to estimate  separate  Phillips  curves  year-by-year  from  1976 
through  1991. The authors find that higher state-level unemployment signifi- 
cantly reduces  state-level wage growth in each year. They also find that the 
Phillips curve (plotted with unemployment on the horizontal axis) is steeper 
when inflation is high, consistent with DNWR, but that this interaction is im- 
precisely estimated and insignificantly different from zero. 
I think the authors’ approach has excellent potential as a tool for assessing 
the impact of  downward nominal rigidity  and other sorts of  frictions on the 
labor market. I have two suggestions for making this tool sharper. First, the 
authors need more degrees of freedom. With fifty U.S.  states, the authors have 
enough cross-section observations to estimate the year-by-year Phillips curve 
slopes reasonably precisely. However, with only sixteen years of data, the au- 
thors do not have enough slopes to estimate the interaction between inflation 
and the slope precisely. The authors could alleviate this problem either by get- 
ting more years of data for the United States, or by including other countries 
for which regional wage and employment information is available.’ 
7. Of course, expanding the data set would limit the extent to which the authors could correct 
wages for the skill composition of  the workforce (as they currently do using the CPS). But this 
shouldn’t  be problematic if the skill distribution at the regional level does not vary much over the 
business cycle, an issue the authors could investigate directly with the CPS or the PSID. 120  David Card and Dean Hyslop 
Second, the  authors need  to pay  careful attention  to endogeneity  issues. 
What the authors presumably want to estimate each year is the relative respon- 
siveness  of wages and unemployment  to labor-demand  shocks. An ordinary 
least squares regression of wage growth on unemployment  will estimate the 
Phillips curve consistently only if all cross-state variation in unemployment is 
due to cross-state variation in the position of the labor-demand curve. It is easy 
to think of reasons why this condition would not hold. For instance, suppose 
that nominal wage growth is predetermined for union workers, but flexible for 
nonunion workers, and suppose that states differ in the extent of unionization. 
Now suppose the inflation rate changes unexpectedly. Real wages and unem- 
ployment would move in the same direction as firms moved along their labor- 
demand curves, causing the Phillips curve to shift, and this shift would be more 
pronounced  in  more  heavily  unionized  states.  In this  example, then,  unex- 
pected inflation  shocks would bias the estimated cross-section  Phillips curve 
toward zero. Of course, what the authors are most interested in is not the slope 
of the Phillips curve, but rather the interaction of the slope with inflation. In 
this example, if the conditional  variance of inflation is uncorrelated  with the 
level of inflation, then the authors have nothing to fear. But if unexpected infla- 
tion  shocks are more likely  at higher  levels of  inflation, then high-inflation 
periods will also be periods in which the slope estimates are more biased to- 
ward zero, masking the interaction between inflation and the slope predicted 
by DNWR. To  avoid such problems, the authors should estimate their Phillips 
curves instrumenting  for state-level unemployment,  using measures of state- 
level labor demand.8 
Conclusion 
Overall, I find Card and Hyslop’s central conclusion-downward  nominal 
rigidity has a positive but economically small impact on the labor market- 
sensible and well-founded. The reader should be cautioned, however, that the 
authors’ results in no way prove that nominal rigidities are unimportant to labor 
market fluctuations. Downward nominal rigidities are only one type of nomi- 
nal friction; even if downward rigidity is not important, generalized nominal 
wage stickiness or nominal illusion may still matter. 
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